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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. WILLIAM RANDALL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TRACY COLLINS TRUST COM-
pANY, Executor of the Estate of 
SARAH P. RANDALL BRERETON, 
Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Civil No. 8430 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from a decree of Judge William 
Stanley Dunford ordering specific performance of 
a contract of the late Sarah P. Randall Brereton 
with her nephew, the plaintiff, J. William Randall, 
concerning, primarily, the controlling stock interest 
of the State Bank of Provo. Both the trial court in 
its Memorandum Decision (R. 34) and the advisory 
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jury, in reply to specific interrogatories submitted 
to it by the court (R. 32) found the factual issues 
in favor of plaintiff. 
Mrs. Brereton was 95 at the time of her death 
in 1954. She had been a widow since 1938 and had 
succeeded her husband as president and principal 
stockholder in the State Bank of Provo. She early 
evidenced a desire to have an arrangement whereby 
she and her affairs would be cared for for the rest 
of her life; and in 1939, proposed to her niece, Mil-
dred H. Brereton, that if she would take care of her 
for the rest of her life, she would leave all her pro-
perty to her niece. Mildred rejected this offer be-
cause Mrs. Brereton's demands "were so intense I 
felt I couldn't follow them out * * * I felt I couldn't 
live a life of my own or have a home of my own 
* * * the demands she made of me were too great." 
(T. 15) 
Mrs. Brereton then turned to the plaintiff, her 
nephew Will, to induce him to dispose of his Ogden 
interests and come down to Provo to take over her 
personal and business affairs. While she was at 
first unsuccessful in persuading plaintiff, he did, 
during the next few years, render numerous serv-
ices to her for which she showed her gratitude by 
gifts to him of property. 
In the spring of 1946, Mrs. Brereton, then 
eighty-seven, finally persuaded plaintiff and they 
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entered into an oral agreement described in the 
Findings of Fact ( 1) of the Court as follows: 
"That between April 1 and September 
1, 1946, plaintiff and Sarah P. Randall Brere-
ton entered in to an oral agreement by the 
terms of which the said Sarah P. Randall 
Brereton agreed that if plaintiff would sell 
his home and leave his business in Ogden, 
Utah, move with his family to Provo, Utah, 
become an employee of the State Bank of 
Provo and would devote his time, talents, 
energy and attention during her lifetime to 
caring for her business and financial affairs, 
particularly her bank, giving her advice and 
counsel in respect to other rna tters and caring 
for her personal affairs such as rendering her 
personal services, care and attention, caring 
for her home, furnishing her companionship, 
meals, protection during illness and the main-
tenance of her home and grounds in an effi-
cient operating condition, that upon her death 
she would leave to him by her will her home 
in Provo and her stock constituting control-
ling interest in the State Bank of Provo. (R. 
60) 
Plaintiff "completely and fully" (R. 47) per-
formed his side of the agreement, and for the bal-
ance of her lifetime, and until the day of her death, 
he so devoted his time, talent, energy and attention 
to her and her affairs, that neither he nor his family 
were able to enjoy a normal family and social rela-
tionship (T. 88-92). 
At about the time this oral agreement was made 
between plaintiff and Mrs. Brereton, she, in ac-
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cordance therwith, changed her will so that it pro-
vided that the plaintiff would receive, as residuary 
l~gatee, the Bank stock and the home in Provo. 
(T. 6) 
However, in 1951, when she was over ninety, 
unbeknown to plaintiff and her other relatives and 
friends, and without using the usual channels of the 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company, as she had in the 
preparation of her will and earlier codicils, but by 
the use of new counsel from Bountiful, where Ross 
Richards lived, Mrs. Brereton executed a new codi-
cil leaving all of her property to Ross Richards and 
disinheriting plaintiff entirely, except for the old 
home in Provo. 
When the existence of this secret codicil was 
discovered on her death, plaintiff promptly filed 
claim against the estate for specific performance of 
his contract with Mrs. Brereton. When the Execu-
tor denied the claim, this suit was brought. 
This action being one in equity for specific 
performance, the issues, both as to the facts and 
the law, were tried to the court. Because of the issues 
of fact to be determined in the establishment of the 
contract and its performance by plaintiff, the court 
enlisted the aid of an advisory jury. For this pur-
pose, the court submitted the following five special 
questions to the jury under instructions placing on 
plaintiff the burden of proving the affirmative 
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answers to these questions by "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence. ( R. 15) Under such instructions, the 
jury unanimously found the answers to each of these 
questions in the affirmative: 
"1. Was there an oral agreement made be-
tween the plain tiff and Sarah P. Randall 
Brereton, deceased, between April 1 and Sep-
tember 1, 1956? 
"2. If there was an agreement, was it agreed 
that the plaintiff would sell his home and 
leave his business in Ogden, Utah and move 
to Provo, Utah and become an employee of 
the State Bank of Provo, and devote his time 
and attention to the personal and financial 
affairs of the deceased during her lifetime? 
"3. Was it agreed that in consideration of 
plaintiff's doing as set forth in interrogatory 
#2 above, that the decedent, by her last will 
and testament, would leave her home and 
bank stock in the State Bank of Provo to the 
plaintiff? 
"4. If the answers to 1 and 2 are 'yes', did 
plaintiff, in accordance with such agreement, 
sell his home and leave his business in Ogden, 
Utah and move to Provo, Utah, and accept a 
position with the State Bank of Provo, and 
devote his time and attention to the personal 
and financial affairs of the decedent during 
the remainder of her lifetime? 
"5. If your answer to interrogatory #4 is 
'yes', were the acts and conduct of the plain-
tiff in compliance with such contract of such 
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a nature that their value cannot be measured 
in money? (Verdict, R. 32-33) 
After opportunity was had for counsel and 
court to secure and examine copies of the transcript 
of the evidence, the issues of fact and law were 
argued to the court. The matter was then taken 
under advisement and the court subsequently issued 
its Memorandum Decision, finding the issues of 
fact and law in favor of the plaintiff. In accordance 
with this Memorandum Decision, a decree was 
entered specifically enforcing the contract and di-
recting the defendant-executor to deliver over the 
bank stock and home to plaintiff. 
It is from this decree based on evidence which 
has passed the test of "clear and convincing" before 
both the jury and the trial court, that this appeal 
is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUP-
PORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PROVING THE EX-
ISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT WAS CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING AND THE CONTRACT ITSELF WAS SUFFI-
CIENTLY DEFINITE AND CERTAIN FOR SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE. 
A. The services rendered by plaintiff cannot be 
measured in money. 
B. The Statute of Frauds is not applicable. 
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POINT III. THE RULINGS ON THE ADMISSION 
OF EVIDENCE WERE CORRECT. 
POINT IV. THE USE OF THE JURY WAS PRO-
PER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUP-
PORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
In appellant's brief under Point I, attack is 
made on both the pleadings and the evidence. From 
what is said on pages 10-13 of that brief with re-
spect to the pleadings, it is assumed that what ap-
pellant contends is that the words "personal affairs" 
as used in the complaint, are not broad enough to 
include an allegation that the plaintiff had agreed 
to render to decedent, Sarah P. Randall Brereton 
the personal services, care and attention as detailed 
in paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact. It would 
appear to be the height of sophistry to contend 
seriously that "affairs", meaning, according to Web-
ster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., "that 
which is done or is to be done", is not a short and 
plain statement of the claim as required by Rule 8 
(a), URCP. See Wilson v. Olroyd, 1 U. 2d 362, 267 
P. 2d 759. In any event, under Rule 15 (b), this 
question of semantics need give no further pause. 
Seamens v. Anderson, 252 P. 2d 209, 212 (Utah, 
1952). The fact that we have devoted this much 
space to answering this first item of plaintiff's state-
ment of points is only to indicate that this first point 
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has about as much merit as the remaining seven. 
Appellant then devotes over ten pages in pur-
porting to review the evidence to indicate its insuf-
ficiency to support the judgment. This guerilla at-
tack of a voiding the main body and detouring the 
strong points can hardly support the statement made 
on page 13 of appellant's brief that "there is very 
little, if any competent and material testimony" 
of the existence of the agreement between Mrs. 
Brereton and plaintiff. 
A more pedestrian yet fairer approach to the 
issue raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence 
would be to do as the trial coud did in its Memor-
andum Decision, and review the testimony of each of 
the witnesses, bearing in mind the five ultimate is-
sues of fact raised by the five special interroga-
tories submitted to the jury. (supra, p. 5) 
First of all, consider the will itself and the codi-
cils thereto which were identified and explained by 
the trust officer of Tracy-Collins Trust Company, 
the executor. Mrs. Brereton's will was executed in 
April, 1940. By its terms, the bank stock was left 
in trust for ten years, the beneficiary during the 
trust as well as the remainderman being her nephew, 
the plaintiff herein. The first codicil in June, 1941, 
made no change with respect to the Bank stock. The 
second codicil in August, 1941, changed the terms 
of the trust so that if plaintiff did not survive the 
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ten year term, the stock was to be distributed to 
others. The third codicil was executed on May 7, 
1946. It cancelled the trust so that the bank stock 
and the home would pass directly to plaintiff as the 
residuary legatee of the will. This change is an af-
firmation of the agreement in issue made at about 
the same time between Mrs. Brereton and her 
nephew, the plaintiff (Finding, No. 3, R. 61). The 
final, secret codicil, in October, 1951, cancelled the 
bequest to J. Will Randall and left the residue of 
the estate to one, Ross Richards, a half cousin of 
Mrs. Brereton. 
The next witness was Mildred H. Brereton. She 
was a niece of Mrs. Brereton and had married a 
nephew of Mr. Brereton. Both she and her husband 
had visited Mrs. Brereton, referred to in the testi-
mony as Aunt Sade, on numerous and frequent oc-
casions and Mildred had lived with her aunt prior 
to her marriage. Mildred testified to an offer of her 
aunt made to her in 1939 (T. 15) and to a trip Mrs. 
Brereton made to Ogden that same year to induce the 
plaintiff, without success, to go to Provo and look 
after her personal affairs. ( T. 17) She also testified 
to the idiosyncrasies and demands of Mrs. Brereton 
which became more exacting and more difficult as 
she grew older. (T. 20) She stated that Aunt Sade 
frequently mentioned that her plan was to have 
Will come down and take over her interests. Finally 
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in the spring of 1946, when Mildred was working 
for a real estate company in Provo, Aunt Sade told 
her to look out for a house for Will as he was coming 
to Provo (TR-22); that she had worked out an 
agreement with him, that he was to take over her 
business and personal affairs and, in return, was 
to get the bank stock and her home. ( Tr. 22-3) 
Aunt Sade referred to this agreement "frequently". 
( T. 23-27). Mildred especially remembered three 
occasions when it was discussed by Aunt Sade. Once, 
when the bank was being re-capitalized (T. 23), once 
when Will had taken Aunt Sade's lunch to her when 
Mildred was visiting and Aunt Sade had said in 
response to a comment, "Yes, they are good to me. 
They look after my needs, but they owe it to me be-
cause of my agreement". (T. 24) The third occa-
sion was when her husband offered to fix the fur-
nace on a cold day and Mrs. Brereton said it was 
"Will's job." (T. 24) Mildred even stated that Mrs. 
Brereton had told her of the agreement "so defini-
tely that I thought it was in writing until this will 
was read. I had no idea it wasn't written up." (T. 
35) 
She testified that Will came down in September, 
1946, and took over management of the Bank. (T. 
23) Mildred also testified that the personal care 
Will and his wife rendered Aunt Sade included fix-
ing the furnace, caring for the house and lawn, doing 
10 
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her washing and ironing, fixing lunches and having 
her at their home for dinner, spending Sundays with 
her, staying with her at night for periods as long as 
a month at a time when she was ill and during inter-
vals after a housekeeper had quit and generally 
looking after all of her "personal affairs" ( T. 26). 
Mildred further testified that Mrs. Brereton 
failed rapidly after her illness in 1950 when she was 
ninety-one, but that in 1951 Aunt Sade had told her 
that she couldn't change her will after she was 
eighty, but that she had attached a codicil on it to 
make Ross Richards the administrator of her estate 
(T. 27). It takes little inference from that naive 
statement and consideration of Mrs. Brereton's fail-
ing strength of mind and body to understand how 
the execution of the secret 1951 codicil came into 
being, and to conclude that Mrs. Brereton had not 
intended thereby to violate her agreement with Will 
Randall. 
Cross examination of Mildred developed only 
that Mrs. Brereton both before and after 1946, had 
had numerous housekeepers, off and on, ( T. 32) some 
who stayed at night only; that these women would 
"just leave" on short notice after they "would get 
so discouraged trying to satisfy Aunt Sade ; ( T. 25) 
and that Mr. and Mrs. Randall stayed with her 
night and day during intervals between housekeep-
ers. (T. 34) It was also shown on cross examination 
11 
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that Mildred's opportunity to observe was based on 
weekly or mol).thly visits to her aunt at her home in 
Provo. (T. 33) 
The next two witnesses A. E. Money and Charles 
H. Dixon, were officers in the Commercial Bank of 
Utah at Spanish Fork. They both testified that in 
1940 they approached Mrs. Brereton about buying 
her interest in the State Bank of Provo, that she put 
them off at that time because she liked being bank 
president, but invited them to come back and talk the 
matter over with her later on. They approached her 
again in the late summer or early fall of 1946, just 
before or just after Mr. Randall came down to take 
over operation of the bank. At that time, she told 
them she had turned her interests over to Mr. Ran-
dall and that he was coming down to take care of 
the bank interests and also to take care of her, and 
that she was well along in years and had to have 
some one look after her. (T. 39-41) Both of these 
gentlemen were so certain in their minds, after 
this second conversation, that Mrs. Brereton had 
made a "deal" with Will, that they dropped the pro-
posed purchase project. On cross examination Mr. 
Dixon stated that he had expressed surprise to learn 
that there was "any disagreement as to his [Mr. 
Randall] being able to procure her interest in the 
bank." (T. 44) 
Mrs. Zenger, the wife of the superintendent 
12 
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of the Utah Valley Hospital testified to having ob-
served the Randalls daily taking Mrs. Randall's 
meals to her (Mildred Brereton having mentioned 
in her testimony that Aunt Sade kept no food in the 
house, using the refrigerator to store dish towels), 
or bringing her to their home for dinner. Mrs. Zen-
ger had become acquainted with Mrs. Brereton in 
1949 when the old lady had made a gift to the hos-
pital and she visited with her about fifteen times 
between that occasion and 1953. During these visits 
Mrs. Zenger frequently remarked on the care, at-
tention and services Mrs. Brereton was receiving 
from Will and his wife, Bea. To these remarks Mrs. 
Brereton replied: "That she knew she was lucky, but 
felt she had it coming to her because the Randalls 
were going to be taken care of" ( T. 50). 
Will Brereton, the husband of Mildred, and a 
grandnephew of Aunt Sade's husband, also had 
visited Aunt Sade frequently both with his wife, 
Mildred, and on other occasions by himself. On these 
visits Mrs. Brereton had mentioned the agreement 
with Will Randall on several instances-the gist 
of the agreement being that Will was to get the 
bank stock and home in return for taking care of her 
and her business. On cross examination counsel tried 
to confuse the witness with reference to his descrip-
tion of the agreement in his deposition. But despite 
such tactics the witness was "definite"that the 
13 
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agreement included her home and her bank and that 
Will was to look after her affairs. ( T. 66) 
Appellant asserts in his brief that the testi-
mony of Mr. Brereton was "vague, uncertain and 
contradictory". It may be admitted that the state-
ments of any witness as to the terms of an oral 
agreement related to him in casual conversation by 
one of the parties would not be as certain as a writ-
ten document, but we submit that this witness was 
certain in his mind as to the impression thereof 
she did give him-that she had an agreement with 
Will Randall-that under its terms, he was to look 
after her affairs and in return, receive her home 
and bank stock. It might be observed that any more 
explicit description might well raise in the mind 
of the trier of the facts a question as to the credi-
bility of a witness's testimony as to the conversa-
tions had some years earlier. 
Clyde Sandgren testified as to conversations he 
had with Mrs. Brereton while he was acting as at-
torney for the Bank in a recapitalization program. 
Leaving aside the voir dire examination on the issue 
as to the confidential attorney-client relationship 
raised by appellant, Mr. Sandgren testified that 
Mrs. Brereton told him she had promised to leave 
Will Randall a controlling interest in the Bank 
through her will in return for coming to Provo to 
look after her interests. ( T. 81) 
14 
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Appellant contends that the testimony of Sand-
gren, Dixon and Money does not establish the exis-
tence of the contract as these witnesses refer only 
to the Bank stock in their description of the agree-
ment of which Mrs. Brereton had told them. Of 
course, that is all that Mrs. Brereton mentioned to 
them, as that is all they were interested in! Plain-
tiff does not contend that each witness proved alt 
the terms of the contract or its performance by him. 
It is Hornbook law that the evidence must be looked 
at as a whole. The testimony of Sandgren, Dixon 
and Money described conversations where the Will-
iam Randall "deal" with respect to the Bank stock 
came up naturally, as an explanation for Mrs. Brere-
ton's position with respect to sale of stock or re-
capitalization of the Bank. The other witnesses, 
Mildred Brereton, Will Brereton and Mrs. Zenger 
had natural occasions to discuss with Mrs. Brere-
ton other aspects of the contract and its performance 
by plaintiff. The testimony of all of them together, 
clearly and convincingly established the contract, its 
terms, and its full performance by plaintiff. 
Other than plaintiff, whose testimony was ex-
cluded under the "dead man" statute, (TR. 102) the 
final witness was Kenneth (Kay) Randall. He testi-
fied to the close personal attention his father ren-
dered to Mrs. Brereton until her death, to the de-
rogation of a normal family and social life. (T. 88-
92). 
15 
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On cross examination he described her eccentri-
cities and demands and the difficulty in keeping 
housekeepers. 
From a review of all the evidence, the trial 
court concluded in its Memorandum Decision: 
"There is no direct evidence to dispute 
any of this testimony, and a careful examina-
tion of the transcript certainly would not 
justify a concept that the effectiveness of the 
testimony had been destroyed on cross exami-
nation. The court thus finds that after the 
decedent had attempted to induce her niece to 
come to Provo to live with her and care for 
her in her old age, that she did make a pro-
posal to the plaintiff to the effect that if the 
plaintiff would dispose of his home and re-
sponsibilities in Ogden and would move to 
Provo and would devote his time and talents, 
his energies and attention to caring for her 
business, particularly her bank, giving her 
advice and counsel respecting other matters, 
caring for her home and providing her with 
personal services such as company, meals, 
protection against illness, the keeping of her 
home and grounds in an efficient operating 
condition, that upon her death she would leave 
to him, by her will, her home in Provo and 
her stock in the State Bank of Provo. The 
foregoing agreement is sufficiently definite 
and certain, under the decisions of our own 
Court, for proper remedy for its violation." 
(R. 43) 
Appellant cites an old case, Lake S~ore Duck 
Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 
309 ( 1917) ' on the scope of review by this court of 
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the evidence in an equity case. It might be more ac-
curate to accept the modern doctrine of review of 
equity decrees as announced in more recent decisions 
of this court. 
The leading case on the subject is Stanley v. 
Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465 ( 1935). With re-
spect to the scope of review on appeal in equity 
cases, the opinion of the court in that case stated: 
"The scope of the review on appeal in 
equity cases is clearly settled in this jurisdic-
tion. 'This court is authorized by the state 
Constitution to review the findings of the trial 
courts in equity cases, but the findings of the 
trial courts on conflicting evidence will not 
be set aside unless it manifestly appears that 
the court has misapplied proven facts or made 
findings clearly against the weight of the 
evidence.' Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 
214 P. 313, 315. 
"To the same effect are Klopenstine v. 
Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712; Singleton v. 
Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, 66; Holman 
v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457; 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513 
101 A.L.R. 532; Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 
503, 56 P. 2d 1; Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch 
Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P. 2d 234." 
Mr. Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion re-
viewel at length the Utah cases on the issue and 
concluded: 
"In short, as held in Wilcox v. Cloward, 
88 Utah 503, 56 P. 2d 1, if after we review 
the record we cannot say that the court came 
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to a wrong conclusion we should affirm. We 
do not reverse if we find the court's findings 
supported by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence, or if supported only by a slight pre-
ponderance, or if the evidence is evenly bal-
anced. Or if there is in the record a slight 
preponderance the other way, for the reasons 
above set out." 
Examples of the application of the Stanley doc-
trine in recent decisions of this court include the 
following: 
In Morley v. Willden, et al., 120 Utah 453 
(1951), -2d 500, Justice Henriod said: 
The voluminous record in this case con-
tains considerable uncontroverted and much 
controverted evidence. A careful examination 
thereof leads us to conclude that the trial 
court's findings and decision are supported 
by a fair preponderance of the evidence and 
should remain undisturbed, under the prin-
ciple repeatedly enunciated by this court and 
reflected in Stanley v. Stanley, 1939, 97 Utah 
520, 94 P. 2d 465. The judgment is affirmed 
with costs to respondents." 
In Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189 (1953), 
264 P. 2d 825, Justice Henriod states: 
"Although we may have decided other-
wise had we been the initial fact finders, we 
believe and hold that there was sufficient 
evidence of fraud * * * as would justify the 
lower court's decision - a decision we cannot 
disturb under principles enumerated by us 
in Stanley v. Stanley * * *." 
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Finally, in Youngren v. King, 1 Utah 2d 386, 
267 P. 2d 913 ( 1954) this court said: 
"This case being one in equity, we are 
of the opinion that the principle and law 
stated in Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 
P. 2d 465 applies. This rule is again restated 
in Morley v. Willden, Utah, 235 P. 2d 500, 
and this court will not disturb the decision 
of the trial court unless there is an abuse of 
discretion and misapplication of the evidence, 
and that by reason thereof the trial court com-
mitted prejudicial error." 
The issue, then, is whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in finding the evidence clearly 
and convincingly established the facts. It is sub-
mitted that it is clear from the record and from 
the memorandum opinion of Judge Dunford that 
he fully considered all the Utah cases on the subject 
and correctly applied their principles. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PROVING THE EX-
ISTENCE OF THE CONTRACT WAS CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING AND THE CONTRACT ITSELF WAS SUFFI-
CIENTLY DEFINITE AND CERTAIN FOR SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE. 
Appellant in its brief appears to confuse and 
mingle two different issues. No distinction is made 
between the question as to the quantum of proof re-
quired by plaintiff to prove the evidence of the con-
tract and the question as to whether the contract, 
once proven, is sufficiently definite and certain that 
a court may frame a decree specifically enforcing 
it. 
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As to the nature of the proof necessary to es-
tablish a contract of this nature there is no dispute 
and never has been. As the trial court stated in its 
Memorandum of Decision, "There is no dispute be-
tween the parties as to the rule that an oral agree-
ment sought to be established against the estate of 
the decedent must be proved by the claimant by evi-
dence which is clear and convincing." (R. p. 36) 
This court has been most specific on this question. 
It is well established that the existence of such a 
contract must be proved with "a greater degree of 
certainty than is required in an action at law," 
Clark v. George, 120 Utah 350, 234 P. 2d 844 at 848. 
The quantum of proof required has been variously 
described but suffice it to say that it must be some-
thing more than a mere preponderance-in other 
words, it must be 'clear and convincing' VanNatta 
v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192, at p. 194, cf. 
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co. 286 P. 2d 
1065. This phrase is the most generally accepted 
wording for a standard of proof over and above 
that generally required in a civil action. This 
Court has made no distinction between this test and 
the term 'clear, unequivocal and convincing', but 
treats them as having synonymous meaning. (e.g. 'if 
the evidence of invalidity is clear and convincing, or, 
as has sometimes been said by this Court, 'clear, un-
equivocal and convincing.' Ulibarri v. Christenson, 
2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P. 2d 170, 1954.") 
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It was this standard which was given to the 
advisory jury (R. p. 15, Inst #2) and the one ac-
cepted and applied by the trial judge. The applica-
tion of this rule to the facts has been made. As we 
have shown above, unless appellant can show abuse 
of this application within the scope of this court's 
duty to review the facts in such case, the finding 
must stand. 
It is submitted that by any standard there 
could be no question in this case as to the existence 
of a contract between plaintiff and defendent. Each 
witness who knew the decedent spoke of such a con-
tract, whether they termed it a "deal", "under-
standing", "obligation", or simply an "agreement". 
There was no disputing their testimony, nor were 
they shaken or weakened with regard to this point in 
cross examination. This evidence was corroborated 
by the codicil executed shortly before plaintiff's 
moving to Provo by which plaintiff was left the 
property, the subject of his agreement. See 69 A.L.R. 
202. Nor did a unanimous advisory jury and the 
trial judge find any difficulties in determining the 
existence of the basic terms of the con tract under 
the higher standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence. 
Nor do we quarrel with the well-established 
rule cited by appellant that "neither the court 
nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties." 
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Andrews v. Aiken, 44 Idaho 797, 260 P. 423, 69 
A.L.R. 14. The court must know what the terms of 
the agreement are in order to frame its decree. As 
this court has said: 
"While it is not essential that all the 
elements of the contract should be detailed as 
having been formally declared or expressed 
by the parties, yet from all the facts and cir-
cumstances as disclosed by the evidence the 
chancellor must be able to read sufficient 
terms and conditions to make a definite and 
complete contract and one founded upon a 
valuable consideration." Price v. Lloyd, 31 
Utah 86, 86 P. 767. 
But what are the uncertainties claimed here? 
Plaintiff alleged that Mrs. Brereton agreed that in 
exchange for services to be rendered her by plain-
tiff that she would "leave to him by Last Will and 
Testament all her stock in the said State Bank of 
Provo which she should own at the time of her 
death, together with her residence in Provo, Utah." 
(Complaint R. p. 4) The advisory jury by special 
interrogatories #2 and #3 found that decedent so 
agreed. ( R. p. 32) What uncertainty is there in 
such an agreement which precludes the drafting of 
a decree? The trial court found none, ( R. 43) as 
its decree (R. 52) shows. The house in Provo was 
easily ascertained. There is no dispute as to the 
number of shares of bank stock involved. Appellant 
in grasping for alleged elements of uncertainty asks 
only three questions (Appellant's Brief p. 25). First, 
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it is asked "was the Plaintiff to receive the bank 
stock and home of decedent or was he to receive all 
of her property?" Obviously, as found and alleged, 
Plaintiff was to receive only the bank stock and the 
house. 
Secondly, it is asked "did decedent understand 
that she was not merely promising specifically to 
do something now, relinquishing her rights sub-
sequently to change her mind if she so desired?" 
vVhat the decedent's state of mind was, has, it is 
submitted, no bearing on the certainty of the terms 
of the understanding between the parties. In any 
event the issue is, of course, not the subjective one of 
what decedent understood, but what she in fact did. 
Plaintiff has alleged and the trial court has found 
that the parties made an agreement which created 
an in praesenti interest for consideration, rather 
than a mere ambulatory revocable statement of dis-
position. 
Thirdly, it is asked, "Was the Plaintiff moving 
from Ogden to Provo to take a job in the bank for 
his own financial and pecuniary benefit or for the 
financial and pecuniary benefit of the decedent?" 
Again it is difficult to see how this bears on the 
certainty of the terms of the agreement. Indeed, it 
would seem unnecessary to have to decide alternati-
vely whether the contract benefited Plaintiff or 
decedent. Assumedly the move benefited both par-
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ties-most contracts are entered into with the con-
cept of mutual benefit. 
The question before the court should be whether 
plain tiff proved the existence of a con tract, and if 
such contract, as proved, is sufficiently definite so 
the court can enforce it. Each portion of evidence 
does not have to confirm the alleged contract in de-
tail. Thus, in Van N atta vs. Heywood, supra, plain-
tiff sued for specific performance of a contract 
allegedly to devise and bequeath the residue of dece-
dent's estate, less a $500 amount. The fact that 
several of the witnesses testified to an agreement 
by which plaintiff was to get the entire estate, thus 
not confirming the exact contract as alleged by 
plaintiff, was treated by this court as corroborative 
of plaintiff's allegations and not as a sign of in-
consistency. To hold that a witness' failure to cor-
roborate each and every detail of an alleged con-
tract is a basis for impeachment of the contract on 
grounds of uncertainty would mean that a claimant 
could use witnesses only at his extreme peril. It 
would make the discovery of acceptable witnesses, 
already taxed by the Dead Man Statute, all but im-
possible, Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust 
Co .. supra. The bizarre result of such logic is its own 
answer. 
A. The services rendered by plaintiff cannot 
be measured in money. 
24 
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At the insistence of Appellant's counsel, the ad-
visory jury was asked to determine whether the 
acts and conduct of plaintiff, the evidence of which 
the jury had heard, was "of such nature that their 
value cannot be measured in money." (Verdict, Sp. 
Inter. No. 5, R. p. 33) The advisory jury answered 
affirmatively. The trial court after extensive re-
view of the evidence stated in its Memorandum of 
Decision: "Clearly this type of service is completely 
adequate to meet the requirements of authorities 
cited and to establish that there would be no ade-
quate remedy in damages." ( R. p. 46). 
A laborious review of the services rendered by 
plaintiff is unnecessary because Appellant's argu-
ment is disposed of by its own brief. Appellant con-
cedes the type of services which are measurable by 
money are those which can be procured from a 
hired servant (Appellant's Brief p. 28). Appellant 
then reprints testimony as to the succession of house-
keepers who stayed with Mrs. Brereton. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 30-31) In other words, Mrs. Brereton had 
hired servants in her house and continued to employ 
them after plaintiff's arrival in Provo. What more 
convincing evidence is there that the services which 
decedent expected from Plain tiff were something 
more than mere menial tasks to be measured in 
money. In addition, we must remember that we are 
not dealing here with the claim of a nurse, hired 
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man or janitor. We are discussing the services ren-
dered by a nephew who was sought out by Mrs. 
Brereton as someone whom she could trust and rely 
upon and who could and would perform significant 
executive functions in the bank and act as financial 
confidant and advisor. ( TR 30) 
The services required to permit specific per-
formance are those "as to invoke the conscience of 
the court in behalf of the promisee". ( 69 A.L.R. 57) 
" ... it must appear that the obligation 
assumed by the promise require some sacri-
fice upon his part but it is not essential that 
the performance should involve a pecuniary 
sacrifice on the promisee's part; the fact that 
he was previously in humble circumstances, so 
that the position was in itself advantageous, 
is not sufficient to warrant a denial of relief 
if the promisee has fully and faithfully car-
ried out the obligations he assumed, and they 
were of a character, the value of which can-
not be estimated by any pecuniary standard." 
(69 A.L.R. 58-59, emphasis added) 
As the Supreme Court of Idaho stated: 
"From all the testimony it is shown that 
deceased did not want respondent for any sort 
of menial services alone, and the question is 
not presented by the pleadings but that he 
wanted her to brighten his life, and to take 
her place in his home again as his own child, 
and the deceased was the best judge of the 
value of these things. The loss to respondent 
of the companionship of Mrs. Peterson and 
the value to the deceased of the child living 
26 
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with him cannot be measured or compensated 
for in money, and such pay was not contem-
plated by deceased ... It is clearly established 
that deceased made the contract, and that re-
spondent had performed her part, and, while 
the services performed in the home by respon-
dent in the way of household duties might 
possibly have been compensated in money, 
those things that respondent gave up, and the 
value of respondent living with the deceased 
as his child, are impossible of measurement in 
money value, and respondent cannot be placed 
in statu quo. The only way possible of com-
pensating respondent is by specific perfor-
mance of the contract, or doing what the 
decedent wished and agreed to do." (White v. 
Smith, (Idaho) 253 P. 849, 854) 
Appellant seems to make much of the fact that 
Plaintiff did not live in the same house with dece-
dent. 
Whether service is of a personal or even filial 
nature cannot be measured by mere mechanical tests, 
such as the place where the promisee lives while 
rendering the services. The nature of the services 
has no relation to the place the promisee lays his 
head at night, nor do the authorities so hold. (See 
69 A.L.R. 57 et seq) 
Not only does the law not require a common 
residence in order to establish a sufficiently intimate 
relationship between the parties, but the evidence 
makes it quite clear that the instant agreement 
betwen the plaintiff and decedent specifically did 
27 
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not contain such a provision. Thus Mildred Brereton 
testified ( TR. 22) that while she was working in 
a real estate office at about the time plaintiff moved 
down to Provo in accordance with the agreement, 
decedent requested that the witness look around 
for a house for plaintiff's family located close by 
that of decedent. It is clear from this that decedent 
never anticipated nor expected plaintiff to share her 
house with her. 
The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff and 
his family worked ceaselessly for the care and com-
fort of decedent, not only performing certain menial 
tasks, but providing her with companionship and 
personal attention under most demanding circum-
stances. Plaintiff clearly conformed his life and 
that of his family to these attentions. The Trial 
Judge in his Memorandum ( R. 45-6) ably sum-
marizes the nature of plaintiff's services and the 
sacrifices he made which made money damages in-
adequate. 
B. The Statute of Fraud is not applicable. 
Appellant devotes the principal portion of its 
section of the brief on the Statute of Frauds to a 
re-argument as to whether the services were measur-
able in money. Except for a reference in one quota-
tion, the issue of part performance, which is dis-
positive of this issue, is not mentioned. 
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Section 25-5-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro· 
vides as follows : 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall 
be construed to abridge the powers of courts 
to compel the specific performance of agree-
ments in case of part performance thereof." 
The Utah Supreme Court has at least twice 
summarily dismissed arguments addressed to the 
statute of frauds in fact situations similar to this. 
VanCott v. Brinton, 33 P. 218; VanNatta v. Hey-
wood, supra. As the court said in VanNatta v. Hey-
wood: 
"Nor do we think that under the undis-
puted facts and circumstances as shown by 
the record this is a case coming within the 
statute of frauds ... The contract between 
the deceased and the plaintiff, although an 
oral one, was taken out of the statute of 
frauds by reason of part performance by the 
plain tiff." 
We are not dealing with a mere executory con-
tract in the instant case. The contract was fully 
performed in every sense of the term by plaintiff. 
The evidence evinced at the trial does nothing but 
corroborate plaintiff's contention that he fully 
performed his obligation under the contract. The 
trial court wholly concurred in its analysis. ( R. 4 7) 
Appellant cites the case of Startin v. Madsen, 
(1951) 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834. We need only 
point to the obvious distinction in this case from 
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the instant one, which the trial judge ably pointed 
out: 
"The Defendent refers us to Startin 
v. Madsen, but two things distinguish that 
case from the instant one. In the first place, 
the Plaintiff at no time maintained that her 
compensation was immeasurable, but sued for 
a specific amount, and, second, there was no 
contract claimed between the parties by which 
the decedents promised to leave property to 
the person performing the services and in 
compensation thereof." (R. p. 46) 
Appellant cites an Illinois case which states 
that the bar of the Statute of Frauds is not removed 
by part performance if the services sued on are not 
unique, but measurable in money. Hols v. Stephen 
362 Ill. 527, 200 NE 601. Plaintiff does not dispute 
this proposition. But either plaintiff's services are 
not unique, in which event he had no right to bring 
this action in equity anyway, or they are not measur-
able in money, as the advisory jury and trial court 
found. If the former is true plaintiff's case has 
failed before reaching the question of the Statute of 
Frauds. The very case cited by appellant concedes 
that if such services are unique, a matter concern-
ing which we have already given detailed discussion, 
part performance eliminates any issue as to the 
Statute of Frauds. Thus by appellant's own authori-
ties, the Statute of Frauds presents no question not 
already resolved. 
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POINT III. THE RULINGS ON THE ADMISSION 
OF EVIDENCE WERE CORRECT. 
Appellant raises two issues as to the rulings of 
the trial court on the admissibility of evidence. The 
first refers to refusal of the court to allow the son 
of the plaintiff, Kenneth Randall, to testify as to 
the salary his father was receiving as an officer 
of the State Bank of Provo. Appellant coupled· his 
statement as to the relevancy of that fact with 
reference to the quality of plaintiff's home in Provo 
as compared with his former home in Ogden (T. 
96). Yet, when Kay testified as to the comparative 
sales price of the two homes (T. 108) appellant's 
counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay, imma-
teriality and irrelevance (T. 109). Surely, Kay's 
testimony as to the salary his father received is 
subject to the same objections! 
It is submitted that the trial court's ruling on 
the salary question adequately disposes of the issue. 
Judge Dunford said: 
"THE COURT: I think probably every-
body in the courtroom, between those years, 
got more than they did before. I don't think 
it has any significance at all what he was 
paid. We don't know what his duties were. It 
is a collateral issue. Maybe he had a lot of 
extra duties given to him by the bank at the 
time he went in there. We won't go into that. 
It will be sustained." 
Appellant's second issue on rulings of the trial 
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court relates to the testimony of Clyde Sandgren. 
Mr. ·Sandgren, a Provo attorney, testified as to con-
versations with Mrs. Brereton in the course of which 
she described the contract with plaintiff. The first 
of these conversations was in May, 1949 while he 
was employed by the State Bank of Provo to handle 
a recapitalization matter for the bank. The second 
was on July 12, 1949, in the course of a social ride 
to Payson (T. 81). 
The following day Mrs. Brereton employed Mr. 
Sandgren to advise her in connection with her will. 
In the course of such service he prepared a letter to 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company (Exhibit "A"). This 
letter was admitted without objection by appellant 
and appellant's counsel proceeded to cross examine 
Mr. Sandgren relative to communications from Mrs. 
Brerton to him concerning the preparation of this 
letter and the problems presented by her will (T. 
82-84). Certainly, if any privilege there was, coun-
sel for appellant waived it by examining Mr. Sand-
gren as to conversations with Mrs. Brereton after 
he was employed by her. In offering Sandgren's 
testimony, plaintiff was careful to confine it to the 
period before July 13th, the date Mr. Sandgren 
fixed as beginning his employment. It is submitted 
that appellant, by going into the clearly privileged 
conversations, has waived any privilege growing 
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out of the relationship between Mrs. Brereton and 
Sandgren. 
But in any event, there was no privilege as to 
the early conversations on May 4th and July 12th. 
The attorney-client relationship between Mrs. Brere-
ton and Mr. Sandgren had not commenced until 
that date. As recognized by this court in Burton v. 
McLaughlin, 117 Utah 483, 217 P. 2d 566, and by 
Wigmore's great work on Evidence, § 2304, a com-
munication is not privileged if made before the rela-
tionship was entered into or after it was ended. The 
trial court so ruled in admitting the evidence ( T. 80 
and 104). With respect to the conversations on the 
social ride to Payson, the comment of Professor 
Wigmore is particularly apt: 
"Sec. 2303. An attorney may often be 
brought into a conversation upon the law 
without any purpose of treating his expres-
sion of opinion as a service rendered profes-
sionally. Such a conversation is not privileged, 
because the reason for the privilege is to 
secure only the freedom of resort to an at-
torney where some applicable interest of the 
client is to be protected and the advice is 
sought or given with a view to its protection." 
The approach to the claim of privilege is well 
stated in City and County of San Francisco v. Su-
perior Court, 31 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P: 2d 26, 25 ALR 
2d, 1418, cited by appellant. The California court 
in that case stated: (1) that the privilege is strictly 
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construed since it suppresses relevant facts that 
may be necessary for a just decision, (2) the pri-
vilege cannot be invoked unless the client intended 
the communication to be confidential (here Sand-
gren testified only to the same thing Mrs. Brereton 
had told numerous other people), and ( 3) only com-
munications made to an attorney in the course of 
his professional employment are privileged (here 
all plaintiff asked of Sandgren was with respect to 
conversations before any employment by Mrs. Brere-
ton). 
It should also be pointed out that Mr. Sand-
gren's testimony was merely corroborative of other 
witnesses and the Memorandum of the trial judge 
would indicate that he gave no greater weight to 
that testimony than he did to others. If the court 
erred in any respect as to the admissibility of Sand-
gren's testimony, it was not prejudicial. It was the 
court and not the jury which was the ultimate finder 
of the facts. 
POINT IV. THE USE OF THE JURY WAS PRO-
PER. 
Finally, appellant makes the astounding pro-
position that the lower court erred in using an ad-
visory jury. We state "astounding" as the trial 
court clearly kept the special function of the ad-
visory jury in its proper place. The court asked no 
general verdict but submitted five special inter-
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roga tories with appropriate instructions as to the 
quantum and quality of the evidence required and 
did not enter judgment on the verdict, but waited 
until a transcript of the evidence was available and 
then heard argument of counsel on the law and facts. 
It then took the entire matter under advisement and 
prepared a detailed Memorandum opinion review-
ing the evidence and the law at length. It later heard 
argument on the objections to the Findings of Fact 
and approved certain amendments. 
It is difficult to see from this record where in 
any respect the court improperly delegated or sought 
to avoid its duty to decide the issues of fact as well 
as law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that under the facts and the 
law of this case, the trial court reached an eminently 
just decision-one amply supported by the evidence. 
That decision should not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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